

A Review of this correspondence reveals:

A. The SSO/DCA describes normal DIA procedures required for the DCA Special Security Officer to provide contractors access to SCI - That is:

- 1) a request to DIA from DCA
- 2) a DIA Staffing cycle and subsequent approval/disapproval on a document-by-document basis.

This process takes typically four weeks or longer to complete according to DCA.

B. I notice in their specific requirements section that some of the info reports needed are NIE's, DIE's and studies.

Release to contractors of the National Intelligence Estimates (NIE's) must be approved by NFIB.

DIA and OSD
review(s)
completed.

I think that problem A could be worked out internally in DIA, needing no DCI intervention since they have created this themselves.

In problem B, this is true concerning since it must be

considered by the Board for specific NIE,
request & justification.

25X1

I have called [redacted]
DIA (11-75130) and asked if he
were familiar with correspondence.
He is not, but said he will get
up to speed and call back. When
he calls back I wanted to ask
him about the internal requirements
for handling these requests. Pointing
out to him the cycle related in
A, above. (He did and stated that the
EISR requires originator release in SI)

I talked to [redacted] STATINTL

in [redacted] Office [redacted] STATINTL

[redacted] is not familiar with this
problem, but said in one similar
to this they refused to give blanket
authority for release of their reports
so stamped & controlled.

Since this seems to be a Sigint
Committee problem, more so than
Security, Maybe we should go
back to [redacted] and get
[redacted] involved in
this also.

STATINTL

STATINTL

STATINTL

6/28 -

[redacted]

DIA go to NSA for relief.

Should go to MFRB only if NSA says no.

STATINTL

Have [redacted] coordinate on answer.

STATINTL

See [redacted] re answer on NIE's.

STAT

Dear ,

DIA is obviously complaining about DCID 1/7 caveats NO CONTRACT/ORCON. There is absolutely nothing in these papers which would indicate a problem with the compartmentation system.

It appears as you say that the problem is within DIA and they ought to be able to solve it themselves. This problem is succinctly stated in the paragraph IC of enclosure 1 TCSP 91176276.

I would be willing to take this problem on but will require considerable amount of additional information regarding (a) SECDEF's policy and doctrine regarding the requirements for ORCON and NO CONTRACT, and (b) DIA's procedures for implementing the use of ORCON and NO CONTRACT.

STATINTL

13 July 1976

NOTE FOR NFIB SECRETARIAT:

STATINTL asked for comments on this paper as to where it should be handled. I have talked to DIA and was informed that the "Problem A" bottleneck is caused by the Communications Intelligence Security Regulations (CISR) which requires originator release for COMINT/SI.

Since this appears to be the bottleneck, suggest SIGINT Division/Committee work out easements and reply.

Executive Secretary
DCI Security Committee

Attachment

STATINTL

INFORMATION

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TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Chairman, Security Committee		
2			
3			

Remarks:



Per our conversation this date. The attached is for your review, recommendation, and/or response as appropriate. General Wilson's memorandum came directly to the NFIB Secretariat. I will not give it further distribution pending your recommendation.



FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

DATE

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

19 JUN 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Release of Sensitive Compartmented Information to Contractors/
Consultants

1. This Agency is concerned with the length of time required to secure release authority so that pertinent Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) may be made available to a limited number of DoD contractor personnel working on high priority contracts affecting the National Defense. A period of one to six weeks is required to secure release depending on which agency or department has primary interest. The constraints placed on these contractors engaged on short suspense projects make it difficult, if not impossible, for them to fulfill their contracts and result in additional cost to the U.S. Government. Because of this time constraint, the Director, Defense Communications Agency (DCA), has requested relief for certain contractor/consultants engaged on the World-Wide Command and Control System (WWMCCS) (enclosure).
2. In line with the request by the Director, DCA, it is requested that the Chairman, NFIB, consider a proposal whereby certain contractors engaged "in-house" as consultants on high priority contracts be authorized to view SI (except GAMMA), TK and TK/P, including NOCONTRACTOR material, in the same manner as DoD personnel working on the same contract, without requesting release approval from the originator.
3. The number of contractor/consultants to be authorized access to the SCI under this proposal would be severely limited. The viewing of such material by concerned contractor/consultants would occur within SI/SAO accredited areas of the Department of Defense, and the contractor/consultant would not be authorized to remove the material from DoD premises or to duplicate any of the material viewed. Further, such contractor/consultants and their contractor employers would be required to agree in writing that any information obtained under this agreement by the contractor/consultants concerned would not be revealed to their parent contractor.
4. Early action on this request would be very much appreciated.

1 Enclosure
DCA ltr, 3 May 76,
[redacted]
(S-TK/P), 1 Cy

THIS LETTER MAY BE DECLASSI-
FIED UPON PHYSICAL REMOVAL OF
CAVEATS AND ENCLOSURE

Samuel V. Wilson
Samuel V. Wilson
Lieutenant General, USA
Director

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DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20305

3 - MAY 1976

IN REPLY
REFER TO:

241

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Release of Intelligence Information

Reference: DoD Directive 5100.79, WWMCC System Engineer,
21 Nov 75

25X1 1. [] In order to exercise the responsibilities specified by reference, the WWMCC System Engineering Organization (WSEO) must acquire and maintain an accurate working knowledge of those aspects of the intelligence collection/fusion/analysis/dissemination process which are necessary to insure a cost-effective and compatible WWMCCS interface and product utilization.

25X1 2. [] Due to the austere manning currently approved for WSEO it is necessary that I augment the staff with contractor/consultant employees. It is also necessary that a limited number of these consultant personnel, who will directly participate on-scene in the WSEO work, be granted "across the board" access to pertinent compartmented intelligence information at the Category III COMINT, TALENT-KEYHOLE, [] and GAMMA level in order for the WSEO to accomplish its mission. Processing time for individual requests for authorization to release compartmented information in the past has ranged from two to four weeks. The WSEO, due to short suspense actions, cannot be constrained by such delays.


25X1 3. [] Specifically, it is requested that the SSO/TCO DCA, on behalf of the DWSE be authorized to grant WSE consultant personnel access to pertinent compartmented information,

DCA/SAO 76 116

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EXEMPT FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION -
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 1 100-556
DECLASSIFY ON: []

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25X1

25X1A

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Enclosure 1

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DCA Memo, 241, Release of Intelligence Information

similar to that access which he grants to DCA personnel, but subject to the additional restrictions outlined in the enclosure. The suggested procedure, also outlined in enclosure 1, would establish:

- a. The number, identity and clearance level of the WSEO contractor consultants.
 - b. The ground rules to be followed by the SSO/TCO DCA with regard to authorizing the access of these consultants.
 - c. The information categories (see Annex A) of documentation which are applicable to this procedure.
 - d. The controls on the WSEO consultants necessary to insure minimum exposure of the accessed material.
4. ☐ In view of the early products the WWMCCS community is anticipating from the WSEO, expeditious approval of this memorandum is requested. I would be pleased to discuss any areas of concern you may have regarding this request.

SIGNED

1 Enclosure a/s

LEE M. PASCHALL
Lt General, USAF
Director, WWMCC Systems
Engineering

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ACCESS BY WSEO CONSULTANTS
TO
COMPARTMENTED INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTS

I. BACKGROUND

25X1 A. [] The WSEO, in cooperation with the WWMCCS Community, Military Departments, Defense Agencies and other DoD components, is responsible for the identification of system solutions within WWMCCS which depend, among other things, on an accurate characterization of intelligence inputs. In addition, the WSEO requires threat data which may affect the concept of operations, the total system design, or the physical or functional performance of any component of the WWMCCS or its supporting subsystems.

25X1 B. [] The current authorized strength of the WSE Organization is 15 professionals. This manpower constraint, coupled with the broad scope and immediacy of the WSE mission, dictates the use of contractual support to the varied, specialized analyses required of the WSEO. The short response time typically necessary in the discharge of the mission described by DoD Dir 5100.79 further emphasizes the need to employ contractor specialists as integral performing members (action officers) of the WSE Organization.

25X1 C. [] The normal DIA procedures required for the DCA Special Special Security Officer (SSO DCA) to provide contractor personnel access to compartmented intelligence documents involves a request to DIA, a DIA staffing cycle and subsequent approval/disapproval on a document-by-document basis. This cycle takes typically four weeks or longer, to complete. In contrast, DCA personnel who can demonstrate a need-to-know and proper access authorization are granted timely access to any document which has been released to the DCA.

25X1 D. [] Successful accomplishment of the WSE mission requires that a limited number of consultants to the WSEO be granted access to material without incurring the time delay described in the preceding paragraph.

II. CONSULTANT ACCESS CONTROLS

25X1 A. [] In recognition of the extreme sensitivity of the compartmented intelligence information/material to which access is being requested, tight controls will be

Encl 1

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imposed over the consultants covered by this agreement. WSEO consultants approved for such access will be acting as individual Action Officers of the WWMCC System Engineering Organization and not as representatives of their parent organizations.

25X1

B. ☐ In addition to the normal security procedures applicable to the material, the WSEO consultants will be subject to the additional constraints outlined below:

1. The SSO/TCO DCA will limit the access of each consultant to those categories of information where the WSE has certified the individual's need-to-know for current job performance.
2. Only those consultant personnel specifically identified to the SSO/TCO DCA as being assigned and approved by the WSE to support the WSEO will be granted access under this agreement.
3. The consultant personnel, and their employer, will agree in writing not to disseminate/reveal any information obtained under this agreement to the employer.
4. Access to information under this agreement will be at approved government facilities and under the cognizance of the SSO/TCO DCA. Documents will be produced as DCA products and will not be released to contractor facilities or contractor employees without the specific approval of DIA.
5. The WSE will advise DIA (through the SSO/TCO DCA) of the names and corporate affiliations of each contractor granted this "special consultant" status.

25X1

C. ☐ The number of individuals to be designated as WSEO special consultants will not exceed ten (10) at any time. It is the WSE's intention that these individuals be available for relatively long-term assignment to the WSEO. The WSE will discourage the rotation of consultant personnel with access under this agreement (both as an additional limit on proliferation of access, and for program continuity). Further, the WSE intends to minimize the number of contractor organizations to be utilized under this agreement.

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III. GENERAL ACCESS REQUIREMENTS

25X1 A. [] In general, the access required by the WSEO consultants will be at the TOP SECRET, Category III COMINT, TALENT-KEYHOLE, [], and GAMMA level. Billets, if required, will be requested for individuals selected as WSEO consultants.

25X1 B. [] The various information categories which, in the aggregate, generate the access requirements requested are described in Annex A to this enclosure.

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APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

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Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

TOP SECRET

(Security Classification)

DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS

NOFORN-	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT-	Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN-	Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY-	USIB Departments Only
ORCON-	Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator
REL . . . -	This Information has been Authorized for Release to . . .